On 3 December, President of Russia Vladimir Pu n delivered the Annual Presiden al Address to the Federal Assembly. He began with an overview of Russia's foreign poli cs, speaking about the the fi ght against terrorism in Syria, poin ng out that Turkey had been providing aid to terrorists in Syria, and saying that he did not understand why the Turkish authori es had ordered the shoo ng down of a Russian bomber. Then the President promised that Russians would respond adequately (but without becoming 'a danger to ourselves as much as to the world), sugges ng that 'probably, Allah has decided to punish the ruling clique in Turkey by making them loose their minds'.
Pu n promised that certain amendments to the RF Criminal Code would be introduced, whereby some minor criminal off ences would be reclassifi ed as administra ve off ences, with one important reserva on -that a repeated off ence must be classifi ed as a criminal act (given that previously, many warnings had been voiced that this idea, while being good in principle, would be compromised by including in this category premeditated crimes against human lives). Besides, the President suggested strengthening the role of juries (which had been gradually undermined over recent years) and expanding the list of crimes that can be submi ed to them (without specifying the crime types).
In the sphere of economics, the current situa on was described as 'complicated but not cri cal'. One of the measures designed to reverse that situa on was to provide support to effi cient companies opera ng outside of the fuel and energy complex (especially those industries that are now at risk, including primarily the construc on, automo ve, and light industries, as well as railway engineering); it was impera ve to adopt fair principles of providing social assistance to those who really need it (it should be remembered that in December, parliament had passed the decision that the re rement age for civil servants would be gradually raised to 65 years), to achieve a balanced budget and keep its defi cit capped at 3% of GDP, and to improve the investment climate. Pu n noted that only 15 percent of all cases on so-called economic crimes ended with a convic on, but that at the same me the vast majority of entrepreneurs who had faced criminal charges fully or par ally lost their business, so he believed that suspects in economic cases should be detained only as a last resort measure. However, the Presiden al Address contains no specifi c legisla ve proposals, and it should be borne in mind that, quite recently, Pu n had expanded the powers granted to inves gators, enabling them to re-ins tute criminal proceedings in tax-related cases without relying on a relevant statement submi ed by a tax inspectorate. Then the President of Russia proceeded to say that it was necessary to introduce mechanisms such as the special investment contract, thus gran ng the regions the right to reduce profi t tax to zero under such contracts (similar experiments, when small-sized businesses had been granted the right to minimize their taxes, had shown that the regions were not interested in such prac ces), while the government would be granted the right to purchase, on a non-compe ve basis, up to 30% of the products manufactured under special investment contracts. Besides, it would be necessary to allocate funding to purchases of patents and licenses in the domes c and foreign markets. The agriculture sector was praised as a posi ve example, its growth rate for many years having been above the average for Russia's economy as a whole. However, then the President voiced the controversial sugges on that the misused agricultural land should be withdrawn from ques onable owners and sold at an auc on to those who can and want to cul vate the land. As far as the demographic policy was concerned, the President said that the maternity capital program should be extended for at least two more years (its implementa on had indeed helped to signifi cantly increase Russia's birth rate). In the healthcare sphere, the President expressed his regret that the number of schools and hospitals had declined, although it is a well-known fact that the large-scale 'enlargement campaign' had been a long-planned and premeditated act.
The President's press conference largely took shape of a report on the successes achieved in implemen ng his socioeconomic policy. All problems were blamed on the oil price plunge. Vladimir Pu n stated directly as follows: 'I support the policy that the Central Bank and the Government pursue to ensure macroeconomic stability', and he believed that the Bank of Russia's current refi nancing rate was adequate. Meanwhile, he admi ed that 35% of the ini a ves listed in the Government's an -crisis plan was yet to be implemented. The President spoke a lot, and very empha cally, of Russia's foreign policy. For the fi rst me, but in line with the previous context, at this press conference Vladimir Pu n admi ed the existence of the Syrian an -Assad non-terrorist opposi on, and even declared the readiness to support it by the air force against the Islamic State terrorist organiza on. However, the general assessment of the situa on was the same -the crisis in the Middle East had been triggered by the USA, but Russia is prepared for a dialogue with everybody.
Vladimir Pu n either evaded direct answers to a number of cri cal quesons (on the Platon tracking device; on the expansion of the paid parking area in the city of Moscow; on the role played by Pskov Oblast Governor Andrei Turchak in the bea ng of journalist Oleg Kashin; on the business ac vi es of the rela ves of CEOs of the Prosecutor General's Offi ce) by saying that they have to be addressed to the law enforcement agencies or to a court of jus ce, or ac vely supported the offi cial measures (in connec on with Platon or the paid parking areas). The only hopeful promise of Vladimir Pu n was to look personally into the case of RBC's journalist Alexander Sokolov (who had been charged with extremism and arrested), no ng however that he knew nothing about the situa on.
December 2015 saw a notable plunge in the price of oil: while as of 1 December it amounted to $ 44.3 per barrel, as of 25 December it was $ 37.9 per barrel, some mes ge ng even lower. The ruble-to-USD exchange rate rose above Rb 70 (as of 1 December -Rb 66.7), to its historic high of December 2014. The budget for 2016 is geared to the average annual oil price of $ 50 per barrel. In this connec on, Russian offi cials began to off er their es mates as to the further development of the situa on. Speaking at a mee ng in Kazan, RF Minister of Finance Anton Siluanov did not rule out the possibility that the oil price in 2016 may plummet to $30 per barrel, while everything pointed to a situa on where low oil prices would prevail over the course of the next year. Bank of Russia Governor Elvira Nabiullina disclosed the parameters set in the 'stress scenario' with oil trading at $ 35 per barrel -if this should be the case, GDP decline will amount to 2-3% (so far, Russia's budget is oriented to GDP growth of 0.7%). On the one hand, the high vola lity of oil prices (in 2015 it rose from $ 44 per barrel in January 2015 to $ 67 in May, then by December it had returned to its January level and con nued its downfall) makes it impossible to conclude that this downward trend is indeed a long-term one. On the other, this is not an impossibility. If this indeed happens, the government will have to make urgent cuts on its expenditures (however, expenditure cuts will be necessary even with a view towards the planned budget target of $ 50 per barrel, because so far the high expenditure level has been sustained by the reserve funds, which are not inexhaus ble). And there is another regre ul fact -we see no serious discussion going on concerning this issue (just as it had been in early 2015, when budget sequestra on amounted to only a few per cent).
Also in December, a kind of consensus was achieved in the framework of several disputes that had been going on in Russia's oil and gas sector. Rosne chose not to appeal against the court ruling, issued in November 2015, whereby the license granted by the Federal Agency for Mineral Resources (Rosnedra) to LUKOIL to develop an oil fi eld in the eastern part of the Taimyr Peninsula in the north of Krasnoyarsk Krai was deemed to be lawful. Thus, the court ruling entered into force. However, RF Minister of Natural Resources and Environment Sergei Donskoi declared that the government would suspend its permission for a more liberal access to Russia's con nental shelf (at present, the right to develop it is being enjoyed only by Gazprom and Rosne , and private companies have been accusing the two oil giants of failing to proceed with their explora on work, while preven ng other companies from ge ng access to that oil fi eld), the government decision being mo vated, among other things, also by the recent plunge of oil prices, which has made any such projects unprofi table. He also noted that the deadlines for the comple on of Rosne and Gazprom's current projects would be extended.
Meanwhile, the acute debate as to Gazprom's currently established monopoly on natural gas exports, which forces all the other natural gas producers to sell their products to the state giant at a monopoly price, is far from being over. The RF Supreme Court, on 13 December, rejected the appeals fi led by Gazprom and Sakhalin Energy against the decisions of the lower courts whereby Rosne had been granted access to Sakhalin-II gas pipeline. Sakhalin Energy's Chief Execu ve Offi cer Roman Dashkov, however, does not rule out the possibility of further appeals (meaning, probably, an appeal to the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federa on). Approximately at the same me, Deputy Chairman of Gazprom's Management Commi ee Valery Golubev said that Gazprom may indeed allow independent gas producers to gain access to gas exports, on condi on that they assume certain obliga ons to ensure proper gasifi ca on process and secure reliable gas supplies. This was the fi rst declara on in this line voiced by a representa ve of Gazprom, which had previously been fi rmly against any such deals. This idea, however, was not shared by Russia's Minister of Energy Alexander Novak, who spoke in favor of a 'single channel for exports'.
In December, two major deals with China were completed in Russia's oil and gas sector. It had long been planned that China should get involved in a number of projects (for example, the purchase of shares in the Vankor Field owned by Rosne ; Minister of Finance Anton Siluanov spoke even of the sale of a big stake in Rosne ), but the par es could not agree on the prices. December saw Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev's severalday visit to China, where evidently many economic coopera on issues were se led. Later in December, the RF government commission on foreign investment approved the acquisi on, by China Petroleum & Chemical Corpora on (Sinopec), of a 20% stake in gas processing petrochemical company SIBUR (its main shareholders are Leonid Mikhelson and Kirill Shamalov). 10% of that stake is valuated to be $ 1.3bn, the deal of purchase has been completed, while the fi nal price of another 10% of shares, to be sold in the next few years, is not yet determined. YAMAL LNG (its majority shareholder is NOVATEK, with a total stake of 20%) sold 9.9% of its shares to the value of $ 1.4bn to the Chinese Silk Road Fund. Given than China's CNPC already holds 20% of its shares, it can be said that the Chinese government has come to own a blocking stake in this project, which is indeed extraordinary both in terms of its scale and value, as well as in terms of tax exemp ons granted by the government. It has also been announced that the new shareholder will provide loans to the company. Borrowed funding, while being a posi ve fact per se, nevertheless is fraught with certain constraints. In both projects, the stumbling block was the ownership of a controlling stake, presently held by the Russian shareholders; no further sale of shares can now be possible without losing that stake.
As expected, Russia declared the suspension, from 1 January 2016, of the free trade agreement with Ukraine due to lack of any progress in the trilateral talks with Ukraine and the EU concerning the EU-Ukraine free trade zone deal. A ban is to be imposed on exports of agricultural products from Ukraine (these, however, now amount to only 2% of Ukraine's exports, as much of the ban had already been imposed earlier by the sanitary control agencies). Ukraine's response was the announcement of a similar embargo and plans of a further reduc on of the volume of purchases of Russia's natural gas, which had already dwindled to one-third of their ini al volume. At the same me, the cease-fi re regime is s ll maintained in eastern Ukraine, which theorecally can serve as a basis for implemen ng the provisions of the Minsk agreement. It is noteworthy that, in December 2015, Italy for the fi rst me voted against the prolonga on of economic sanc ons introduced against Russia (these may be imposed at various levels of EU government, but only by a unanimous vote), and then, a few days later, it agreed that the sanc ons can be extended un l 31 July 2016. Also in December, the USA expanded its list of sanc ons on individuals and en es to include, in the main, the affi lia ons of those Russian banks and state companies that had already been placed on that list. Some important administra ve structure reshuffl es took place in Russia's Ministry of Internal Aff airs. By President Vladimir Pu n's Execu ve Order, Dmitry Mironov was appointed to the posi on of Deputy Minister of Internal Aff airs; previously, he had worked at the Federal Protec ve Service (FSO), and then headed the General Administra on of Economic Security and Comba ng the Corrup on of the RF Ministry of Internal Aff airs. His successor in the post of the General Administra on of Economic Security became his former deputy Andrei Kurnosenko.
